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  • AS Relation Model

    Our portal represents various analytical data regarding the relation types between autonomous systems (AS). For each AS we openly display its current links as well as the dynamics of their changes. This information is updated daily.

  • Radar Monitor

    Our monitoring system allows detection of a wide range of network anomalies which may have a significant impact on the end-point network resource availability. Currently we provide the information about detected static and dynamic routing cycles, Route Leaks, DDoS amplifiers and bots. The details on the detected incidents are available for technical representatives of the given AS.

  • Reverse LG

    Reverse LG is an exclusive network tool for determining the route which will be used by any other AS in order to reach your AS depending on the given routing policy. This tool is implemented using the modeling of inter-AS relations and priorities on all levels of BGP decision-making.

  • AS Rating

    In order to simplify the process of comparing different AS our portal provides a set of ratings which let the user perform comparisons by various parameters. For user convenience we have added the search function which makes evaluation of a certain AS in the list a lot easier.

Blog

April 11th, 2019

Bad news, everyone! New hijack attack in the wild

On March 13, a proposal for the RIPE anti-abuse working group was submitted, stating that a BGP hijacking event should be treated as a policy violation. In case of acceptance, if you are an ISP attacked with the hijack, you could submit a special request where you might expose such an autonomous system. If there is enough confirming evidence for an expert group, then such a LIR would be considered an adverse party and further punished. There were some arguments against this proposal.

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April 8th, 2019

BGP perforating wound

It was an ordinary Wednesday on 4.04.2019. Except that at some point of the midday timeline an AS60280 belonging to Belarus’ NTEC leaked 18600 prefixes originating from approximately 1400 ASes. Those routes were taken from the transit provider RETN (AS9002) and further announced to NTEC’s provider - RU-telecom’s AS205540, which, in its turn, accepted all of them, spreading the leak.

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