September 21st, 2021
The 2021 National Internet Segment Reliability Research
The National Internet Segment Reliability Research explains how the outage of a single Autonomous System might affect the connectivity of the impacted region with the rest of the world. Most of the time, the most critical AS in the region is the dominant ISP on the market, but not always.
As the number of alternate routes between AS’s increases (and do not forget that the Internet stands for “interconnected network” - and each network is an AS), so does the fault-tolerance and stability of the Internet across the globe. Although some paths are more important than others from the beginning, establishing as many alternate routes as possible is the only viable way to ensure an adequately robust network.
The global connectivity of any given AS, regardless of whether it is an international giant or regional player, depends on the quantity and quality of its path to Tier-1 ISPs.
Usually, Tier-1 implies an international company offering global IP transit service over connections with other Tier-1 providers. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that such connectivity will be maintained all the time. For many ISPs at all “tiers”, losing connection to even one Tier-1 peer would likely render them unreachable from some parts of the world.READ MORE →
March 25th, 2021
Addressing a particular internetworking misconception
Since 2014 Qrator Labs has developed a BGP monitoring and analytics service called Qrator.Radar. One of its main features is monitoring specific BGP anomalies that could result in an incident that we would further call either a BGP route leak or BGP hijack.READ MORE →
February 20th, 2021
The day the whole world did not walk away
Yesterday, on February 19 Internet observed yet another demonstration of a handy Noction feature that is probably supposed to get you rich but is more likely to make you infamous.READ MORE →
Starting from 09:48 UTC, we saw around 200 thousand routes of previously non-existent prefixes with broken AS_PATH. But first things first.
January 28th, 2021
Prepending the trouble
January 27 of the year 2021 was marked with quite a peculiar route leak. AS61666 - GLOBO started announcing prefixes of its upstream provider MHNET - AS28146 to its another provider ALGAR - AS16735. In three minutes GLOBO leaked 1330 prefixes, and the whole routing incident lasted for 8 minutes - a time that was enough to create 1435 conflicts in 21 countries with 265 ASNs, mainly in Brazil (194 ASNs), United States (22 ASNs) and Venezuela (7 ASNs).READ MORE →