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  • December 30th, 2017

    Indian Route Leak or There and Back Again

    On the 30.12.2017 Idea Cellular Limited (AS55644) created a massive BGP route leak between its peers and upstream providers, including TATA (AS6453), Reliance Globalcom Limited (AS15412) and Sify (AS9583). This anomaly affected an enormous number of networks all over the world, including content providers, transit ISPs - more than 70000 prefixes overall.

    Check if your IP, AS or Domain was affected:  

  • December 21st, 2017

    Real-time Connectivity and the Radar API

    Radar team wishes you a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year! Also, we brought you some presents.

    A year ago we announced our first real-time service - the connectivity graph. In this challenging part of our project we needed to compress all paths from more than 400 BGP sessions into a single model representation, and then restore it back in a single-valued manner, doing this in less than one minute. Since the announcement we had a hard time facing several bottlenecks in computation process, as we were migrating all other connectivity and security streams to the new real-time engine. Finally, we can share results of the work: from now on all data in connectivity section is updated with a 1-minute delay! Therefore any changes in your connectivity, including your customers, providers or peers connectivity could be verified on our website in nearly real-time.


  • December 13th, 2017

    Born to Hijack

    New ISPs emerge every day, and 12 December was not an exception. A new interdomain routing ecosystem actor, AS39523 (DV-LINK-AS) started announcing its address space (one prefix), while at the same time this new network hijacked 80 high profile prefixes. The hijacked prefixes belonged to both Russian and International content providers such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft,, Vkontakte and many more.

    Check if your IP, AS or Domain was affected:  

  • November 17th, 2017


    On November 7, 2017, a bunch of blogs wrote about a route leak created by Level3 that affected a significant amount of users. Route leaks happen all the time, and we persistently monitor them all around the world. Except for the mentioned one, which was not detected by our system. So, for Qrator.Radar team it was vital to get into details of this particular incident and understand why our detectors missed this one. We decided to look into it, but this incident analysis took us some time. However, here's the result.

    Check if your IP, AS or Domain was affected:  

  • November 2nd, 2017

    Full Path Incidents & Bogons

    Qrator Labs Radar team is proud to announce the significant change in detection of routing incidents. Previously we were able to give information only about ‘abnormal’ subpath, due to limits of our previous model representation. We put a lot of effort to design and deploy our new model that is capable of processing hundreds of full view BGP sessions in real time which includes compressing data, analyzing compressed representation and full AS_PATH reconstruction for detected incidents. This change substantially increased our opportunities to detect accepted route leaks. Also, with this new functionality, we decided to add in our security section information about bogon routes.


  • October 17th, 2017

    Global consequence of the specific bug in a Quagga routing engine

    Two weeks ago Qrator Radar team encountered an intricate network incident, which clarification resulted in an internal investigation/research, victims and perpetrators search and attempts to remedy the situation. On September 30, 2017, our team drew attention to an unusually large number of flashing BGP sessions.

    Check if your IP, AS or Domain was affected:  

  • September 28th, 2017

    Local Leak with Global Effects

    On Wednesday, September 27, at 13:28 UTC AS9299, belonging to the largest ISP at the Philippines - Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT), leaked prefixes between several Tier-1 operators (TATA, Cogent, Telecom Italia, PCCW) and AS1273, owned by Vodafone Europe. As a result traffic from more than 2000 prefixes in USA, India, and Philippines was redirected to Asia region.

    Check if your IP, AS or Domain was affected:  

  • September 22nd, 2017

    When Bank Plays in IP-transit Games

    On September 22 at UTC 8:00 AS51136, belonging to the HomeCredit Bank, leaked more than 55 000 prefixes between two huge ISPs Transtelecom (AS20485) and Vimpelcom (AS3216).

    Most of the affected prefixes are originated by ISPs from United States, China, Brazil, Japan, Mexico, Canada and Russia. This anomaly ended only at 10:22, making this route leak enduring for more than 2 hours.

    Check if your IP, AS or Domain was affected:  

  • September 8th, 2017

    Massive Vodafone India route leak

    On September 5 the year 2017, at 15:03 UTC AS55410, owned by Vodafone India leaked more than 10 000 prefixes in the direction of AS1273, belonging to the parent Vodafone holding headquartered at Newbury, United Kingdom. This leak further spread to the outer world, including most Tier-1 ISPs.

    Three big Indian ISPs suffered directly: (ASNs: 4755, 18101 and 9498), increasing latency in their networks. More than 400 operators within South Asia region were affected collaterally. The active phase of this incident lasted for 5 minutes, with a total leak duration of 25 minutes.

    Check if your IP, AS or Domain was affected:  

  • July 11th, 2017

    Reliability of National Internet Segments

    The connectivity of Internet at the network layer is a result of interaction between autonomous systems (AS), and it is more stable the more alternatives routes between ASNs there exist, which is basic fault tolerance principle. This research shows how outage of single, though significant AS affects the global connectivity of the region.


  • May 10th, 2017

    BGP Open Ports

    Qrator Radar team is pleased to announce a new feature of our network scanner: we begin to detect hosts with vulnerable ports in your network. At this moment we are detecting open TCP ports of BGP network protocol. This protocol is often used by network devices (especially border routers), and generally access to these devices should be restricted using ACL. If such port is open for everyone, it is a serious vulnerability which can be used by attacker to cause denial of service of the network device, which can in turn cause outage of whole networks.

    To check your networks for vulnerable hosts, please visit the \"Vulnerable Ports\" page on our website.


  • April 6th, 2017

    New Client Portal and Qrator Initiatives

    For a long time, we have been working on the improvement of the UI. Today, we are pleased to announce our first step – the client portal has been totally redone. We hope you will notice that the reports are much more useful and the configuration process is easier now. We are also launching Initiatives website where we are going to share our ideas on changing the Internet to the better. As for now two initiatives are described – route leak mitigation and ASN union. You are welcome to subscribe, comment and share your ideas!


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